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For adults, ownership is nonobvious: (a) determining ownership depends more on an object’s history than on
perceptual cues, and (b) ownership confers special value on an object (‘‘endowment effect’’). This study exam-
ined these concepts in preschoolers (2.0–4.4) and adults (n = 112). Participants saw toy sets in which 1 toy
was designated as the participant’s and 1 as the researcher’s. Toys were then scrambled and participants were
asked to identify their toy and the researcher’s toy. By 3 years of age, participants used object history to deter-
mine ownership and identified even undesirable toys as their own. Furthermore, participants at all ages
showed an endowment effect (greater liking of items designated as their own). Thus, even 2-year-olds appre-
ciate the nonobvious basis of ownership.
Ownership is central to a wide swath of human
behavior, ranging from sibling disputes to interna-
tional diplomacy. Legal, economic, ethical, religious,
and social status decisions rest in part on determin-
ing ownership (Bloom & Gelman, 2008; Kalish &
Anderson, 2011; Reb & Connolly, 2007; Thaler, 1980;
Turiel, 2002; Wangdu, Gould, & Richardson, 2000).
From a theoretical standpoint, ownership is of inter-
est because it is a cognitive construction, not materi-
ally present in the owned object. As Snare (1972,
p. 200) aptly stated, ‘‘[A] stolen apple doesn’t look
any different from any other apple.’’ Moreover, this
conceptualized link between person and property is
nonobvious in two ways: (a) determining ownership
depends more on an object’s history than on overt
perceptual cues, and (b) ownership confers special
value on an object (‘‘endowment effect’’). The
present investigation examined these concepts in
preschoolers and adults.
Ownership and Object History
A mature concept of ownership entails the
central insight that ownership does not reduce to
psychological, proximity, or outward perceptual
cues. For example, the hat in your closet is yours
because you originally purchased it. A hat cannot
be considered yours just because you like it or want
it. Similarly, transfer of ownership can occur with-
out any changes in liking, wanting, or physical pos-
session (e.g., an inherited object is transferred from
one person to another, without any physical move-
ment).
One important way to assess ownership is to
consider an object’s history. This includes a wealth
of factors, including: spatiotemporal cues (e.g., a
spy might track which of two glasses contains
poison by observing its placement over time), traces
of history (e.g., a detective might dust for finger-
prints), and economic interactions (e.g., buying,
swapping, or stealing). Importantly, object history
is distinct from other sorts of cues that are relevant
to identity, including featural cues (e.g., shape,
size), sortal cues (e.g., the small puppy you saw last
year might now be a large dog), and causal cues
(e.g., a large balloon can transform into a shred of
latex). Because ownership relies on object history,
and not (solely) featural, sortal, or causal cues,
ownership can be said to have a nonobvious basis.
Children’s Understanding of Object History as the Basis
of Ownership
Naturalistic observations confirm that ownership
is salient to young children (Fasig, 2000; Hay, 2006;
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Levine, 1983; Ross, Tesla, Kenyon, & Lollis, 1990;
Saylor, Ganea, & Vázquez, 2010) and that children
employ adult-like heuristics for identifying owners.
For example, children and adults attribute owner-
ship of an object to the first person they see pos-
sessing it (Friedman, 2008; Friedman & Neary,
2008). Moreover, young children understand that
ownership is not wholly reducible to current pos-
session. Eisenberg-Berg, Haake, Hand, and Sadalla
(1979) and Eisenberg-Berg, Haake, and Bartlett
(1981) presented children (2–5 years) with a new
toy and studied how they interacted with the toy in
the context of other children. Children who heard
that the toy belonged only to them defended their
possession of the toy more aggressively than chil-
dren who heard that the toy belonged to their class.
Ross (1996; Ross et al., 1990) similarly found that
when preschoolers argue with peers or siblings,
ownership takes priority over possession. Further-
more, 4-year-olds distinguish between ownership
and temporary custody in their interpretations of
‘‘have’’ (Meroni, Gualmini, & Crain, 2007).
By age 4, children’s ownership concepts can be
quite sophisticated. For example, 4-year-olds
understand that the person who allocates control of
an object is its owner (Neary, Friedman, & Burn-
stein, 2009). Preschool children also recognize that
ownership can transfer as a result of creative labor
on the part of an individual (Kanngiesser, Gjersoe,
& Hood, 2010). At the same time, experimental
studies reveal developmental changes in children’s
ownership concepts. Ross (1996) found that 2-year-
olds used possession arguments to justify owner-
ship, suggesting possible confusion between these
concepts. Similarly, Hay (2006) reported that some
preschool children justified ownership by appealing
to desire. Other developmental changes are found
in how children reason when objects are transferred
from one person to another (Blake & Harris, 2009;
Hook, 1993; Kim & Kalish, 2009; Silberstein, 1998).
In the real world, ownership cues often converge
with other factors, such as physical proximity,
object desirability, and perceptual and functional
features: A child’s own toys typically are currently
in her possession, are desired by the child, and
have distinctive perceptual and functional features.
Therefore, precise experimental manipulation is
required in order to determine which factors chil-
dren find most relevant.
Endowment Effect
A second way in which ownership is nonobvious
is that it confers special value, above and beyond
an object’s material or functional properties. The
‘‘hidden value’’ of ownership is seen in the endow-
ment effect: Simply stipulating an ownership rela-
tion, or placing an object in someone’s possession
(Reb & Connolly, 2007), evokes heightened prefer-
ence for that object. For example, if participants
receive an object (e.g., a new coffee mug) and then
have an opportunity either to keep the original
object or to trade it for an object of comparable
value (e.g., a new pen), most adults prefer the
original object and will not trade unless the new
object is of significantly greater value. This
phenomenon has been replicated many times (e.g.,
Beggan, 1992; Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker,
2007; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990; Thaler,
1980). Furthermore, nonhuman primates appear to
show an endowment effect with consumable items
(food). For example, Brosnan et al. (2007),
Kanngiesser, Santos, Hood, and Call (2011), and
Lakshminaryanan, Chen, and Santos (2008)
employed similar methods (using fruit discs and
cereal chunks as goods) to demonstrate that chim-
panzees and capuchin monkeys likewise exhibit an
endowment effect. This effect is not as strong with
nonconsumable goods (e.g., rope), which are less
evolutionarily salient.
However, whether and when children show an
endowment effect remains unclear. Some children
place special value on certain objects owned in
infancy (so-called attachment objects; Winnicott,
1969), and anecdotal evidence suggests that even
infants may resist swapping the original attachment
object for a replacement. Hood and Bloom (2008)
find that children 3–6 years of age prefer a beloved
object to an exact replica. However, it remains
unclear when the endowment effect emerges in
development. Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund
(2001) found endowment effects in children 5–
10 years of age, although few details are provided
concerning the numbers and age range of partici-
pants at each age. In an unpublished conference
presentation, Martin, Barrett, and Rosser (2005)
reported an endowment effect among sixth graders.
In contrast, Lucas, Wagner, and Chow (2008) found
that only one third of 4-year-olds showed an
endowment effect, and overall performance was
inconclusive (0.91 trades of 2 possible; M. Lucas,
personal communication). Thus, few strong conclu-
sions can be drawn about endowment effects in
children, particularly in children below age 5.
Another open question is whether endowment
effects concern object types or object tokens. The
endowment effect has nearly always been tested
with objects of distinct types (e.g., after being given
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a mug, what is the likelihood that she will trade it
for a pen?) rather than with objects of the same
type (e.g., trading one mug for another). Thus, it is
not clear whether the endowment effect attaches to
particular objects (the key prediction if ownership
increases the value of the owned object) or instead
only to contrasting types of objects. For example,
one could increase one’s valuation of mugs, with-
out necessarily judging that a particular mug
carries special traces of its history. Indeed, there is
also evidence that owning one object of Type X
increases adults’ valuation of other objects of Type
X (Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2009).
Present Studies
The present studies were designed to test when
children understand ownership as a nonobvious
attribute, by examining two concepts: (a) that own-
ership rests on object history rather than observable
features (Experiment 1) and (b) that ownership
increases the value of an object (Experiment 2). Pre-
school children and adults received a simple task in
which they were first given verbal cues about own-
ership (e.g., ‘‘This is yours; this is mine’’) and then
were asked to determine which of a set of toys is
theirs (Experiment 1) and which of a set of toys
they like best (Experiment 2). In order to attend to
object history, participants had to track the unique
identity of the owned objects as they moved
through space and time. Object history cues at
times competed with cues regarding object appear-
ance and object value.
Three kinds of item sets were included: (a) Identi-
cal sets. For these sets, the three toys are perceptually
and functionally equivalent (e.g., three identical toy
parrots). These sets pit perceptual and functional
cues against object history. If children judge owner-
ship on the basis of perceptual and functional rele-
vance, then on this set they should not bother to
track which specific item is theirs, assuming that
any equivalent item will suffice. In contrast, if chil-
dren attach significance to object history in deter-
mining ownership and object value, they should
track the spatiotemporal path of the objects when
making their judgments. (b) Child-plain sets. For
these sets, the toy assigned to the child is less desir-
able than the other two toys (e.g., child-target is a
plain styrofoam cone; the researcher-target and foil
are colorful toy animals). This set pits desirability
against object history. If children judge ownership
and value on the basis of desirability, then on this
set they should select one of the animals as theirs
rather than the cone. In contrast, attention to object
history should lead children to select their own
object. (c) Varied sets. These items are perceptually
and functionally distinct (e.g., toy elephant, toy alli-
gator, toy hippo). This is a baseline control, and
tests basic comprehension of the task and ability to
remember which item was theirs. Children in all
age groups should readily display accurate owner-
ship judgments on such sets.
Experiment 1: Ownership Judgments
Experiment 1 examines ownership judgments,
when object history is placed in conflict with other
cues. To adults, the task may seem deceptively
simple, as it can be solved simply by tracking (via
spatiotemporal cues) which objects are initially
labeled yours versus mine. The answer is, in effect,
given from the start. Spatiotemporal cues are
central to human perception and cognition (Burt &
Sperling, 1981; Michotte, 1946 ⁄ 1963; Navon, 1976),
and even infants are highly adept at tracking the
identity of individual objects (Spelke, Kestenbaum,
Simons, & Wein, 1995; Xu & Carey, 1996). By
preschool age, children skillfully monitor spatio-
temporal cues to judge identity (Gutheil, Gelman,
Klein, Michos, & Kelaita, 2008; Gutheil & Rosen-
gren, 1996; Hall, 1996; Sorrentino, 2001; Williamson,
Jaswal, & Meltzoff, 2010).
However, it is unknown whether children privi-
lege such information to determine ownership.
Children could instead rely on current possession
and fail to track the spatiotemporal path of the
target object, they could treat ownership as an
extension of their own desires and thus select the
toy they want rather than the toy they were given,
or they could rely on featural cues and thus select
randomly when the target object is identical to the
foils. In contrast, we predicted that even young
children would be highly sensitive to object history.
Two-year-olds are of special interest given that
many children are only starting to learn the words
for ownership relations (yours, mine) at this age
(e.g., Hay, 2006; Levine, 1983). Finally, there are
very few investigations of ownership concepts in
children below 3 or 4 years of age.
A final question is whether this sensitivity, if
found, would apply to judgments of self-owned
objects only or also to judgments of objects
owned by others. For adults, memory for
self-owned objects is greater than memory for
objects owned by others (Cunningham, Turk, Mac-
donald, & Macrae, 2008; van den Bos, Cunningham,
Conway, & Turk, 2010). To the extent that this
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‘‘self-reference effect’’ is a fundamental way of
organizing experience, we might expect to find it
displayed in children as well.
Method
Participants. Participants included twenty-one
2-year-olds (10 girls; 2.0–3.0, M = 2.6), eighteen
3-year-olds (9 girls; 3.3–4.4; M = 3.8), and 18 adults
(10 women; 17–21, M = 18.6). Four additional
2-year-olds were dropped: Three were unable to
complete the task, and one answered fewer than
one third of the test questions. Three additional
children were dropped due to experimenter error.
Children were recruited from communities in and
around a Midwestern university town; most were
White. Adults were undergraduates at a large
university in the same town, and participated for
course credit; 72% were White.
Materials. Materials included 12 animal toys, 12
food toys, 12 furniture toys, 12 vehicle toys, and 4
‘‘plain’’ objects (see Table 1 and Figure 1). The non-
plain objects were selected to be equivalent in
attractiveness, complexity, size, and interest within
a domain, whereas the plain objects were selected
to be much less attractive, complex, or interesting.
For each participant, within each domain, a subset
of 8 toys plus 1 of the plain objects were arranged
into three item sets of 3 toys each: identical
(all three items are identical), participant-plain
(participant’s object is plain and less desirable than
the other two objects), and varied (all three
items are perceptually distinct and equivalent in
valence).
Three-year-olds and adults received 12 item sets
of 3 toys each: For each of the four domains
(animal, food, furniture, and vehicle), they received
1 identical set, 1 participant-plain set, and 1 varied
set. Two-year-olds received exactly the same item
sets, except that the furniture items were excluded,
in order to shorten the task to accommodate their
shorter attention span, thereby resulting in 9 item
sets instead of 12. The sets were constructed with
two primary constraints in mind. First, we counter-
balanced which item was assigned to the partici-
pant (in the identical and varied sets) and which
item was assigned to the researcher (in the identical
and participant-plain sets). For example, the animal
toy assigned to the participant was hippo, parrot,
or tiger (each one third of the time, for the identical
and varied sets). Second, the sets were assigned
such that no toy appeared in more than one set for
any given participant. For example, if one partici-
pant received the hippo in the varied animal set,
then the hippo could not appear in either the par-
ticipant-plain animal set or the identical animal set
for that participant. There were three assignments
of sets to participants, indicated in Table 1 as
Assignments 1, 2, and 3. Thus, one third of partici-
pants in each age group received Set 1 for all item
types (identical, participant-plain, and varied) and
domains (animal, food, furniture, and vehicle), one
third received Set 2 for all item types and domains,
and one third received Set 3 for all item types and
domains. In order to counterbalance assignment of
toys to sets fully, we kept certain toys constant
within a domain: the toy assigned to the participant
in the participant-plain set, the toy assigned to the
Table 1
Item Sets in Experiments 1 and 2
Domain Set type Set 1 Set 2 Set 3
Animals Varied Hippo, alligator, elephant Parrot, alligator, elephant Tiger, alligator, elephant
Animals Participant-plain Styrofoam cone, tiger, horse Styrofoam cone, hippo, horse Styrofoam cone, parrot, horse
Animals Identical Parrot, parrot, parrot Tiger, tiger, tiger Hippo, hippo, hippo
Food Varied Corn, carrot, grapes Pepper, carrot, grapes Tomato, carrot, grapes
Food Participant-plain Cardboard, tomato, pear Cardboard, corn, pear Cardboard, pepper, pear
Food Identical Pepper, pepper, pepper Tomato, tomato, tomato Corn, corn, corn
Furniture Varied Crib, chair, lamp Infant seat, chair, lamp Wardrobe, chair, lamp
Furniture Participant-plain Wood disk, infant seat, couch Wood disk, wardrobe, couch Wood disk, crib, couch
Furniture Identical Wardrobe, wardrobe, wardrobe Crib, crib, crib Infant seat, infant seat, infant seat
Vehicle Varied Motorcycle, airplane, fire engine Taxi, airplane, fire engine Train, airplane, fire engine
Vehicle Participant-plain Block, train, truck Block, motorcycle, truck Block, taxi, truck
Vehicle Identical Taxi, taxi, taxi Train, train, train Motorcycle, motorcycle, motorcycle
Note. In each set, the participant-assigned toy is listed first, the researcher-assigned toy second, and the unassigned (foil) toy third.
Each participant received one varied, one participant-plain, and one identical set in each domain (either Set 1, Set 2, or Set 3).
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researcher in the varied set, and the foil (un-
assigned) toys in the participant-plain and varied
sets.
Finally, three mini-containers of Play-Doh (Hasbro,
Pawtucket, RI) were presented as the final set for
each child participant. Other materials included a
white, rectangular plastic tray on which the toys
were placed before the test questions were adminis-
tered, and a brightly colored, ‘‘alien’’ puppet
(referred to as ‘‘Zippy’’) that was used for a subset
of items (see the next section).
Procedure. The participant and researcher sat at a
small table, at right angles from one another (see
Figure 2). On each trial, the researcher brought out
three objects, one at a time: a self-target (assigned
to the participant), an other-target (assigned to the
researcher), and a foil (assigned to neither partici-
pant nor researcher). (Self and other are designated
from the perspective of the participant—not the
researcher.) For the self-target, the researcher held
up the toy, showed it to the participant, said ‘‘This
is yours; this is for [participant’s name],’’ and then
placed it in front of the participant. For the other-
target, the researcher held up the toy, showed it to
the participant, said ‘‘This is mine; this is for
[researcher’s name],’’ and then placed it in front of
herself. For the foil, the researcher held up the toy,
showed it to the participant, said ‘‘See this; look at
this,’’ and then placed it on the table equidistant
from the self-target and other-target toys.
Thus, for the self-target and other-target, owner-
ship was cued unambiguously. The foil was also
highlighted, but without ownership information.
The targets and foil were then placed in a row on a
plastic tray as the participant watched, so that
spatiotemporal cues were continuously available.
Current possession was not available as a dimen-
sion on which to select objects, as none of the items
were in close proximity to the participant or
researcher at the time of test. However, because
one end of the tray was closer to the researcher (see
Figure 2), we will also examine whether a toy’s
   Sample Varied Set 
   Sample Child-Plain Set 
Figure 1. Sample item sets, Experiments 1 and 2.
Figure 2. Schematic diagram of aerial view of the experimental
setup, during (a) labeling phase and (b) test phase.
Note. Square indicates the table, small circles indicate placement
of the toys, and gray rectangle indicates the tray.
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position on the tray may have influenced partici-
pants’ judgments (see the object position analyses).
Test questions focused on ownership: (a) ‘‘Which
one is yours?’’ (self-question) and (b) ‘‘Which one
is mine?’’ (other-question). The item sets were
ordered such that each group of three contained
one set per type (varied, participant-plain, identi-
cal), and each group of four contained one trial per
domain. Furthermore, we counterbalanced which
set participants received first. The order of domains
was kept constant across participants (food, animal,
vehicle, [furniture]; food, vehicle, animal, [furni-
ture]; animal, [furniture], vehicle, food; as men-
tioned earlier, furniture items were included for the
older children and adults only). Toys within a set
were presented in four counterbalanced orders
within subjects (self, other, foil; other, self, foil; foil,
self, other; foil, other, self). The foil object was
never presented between the self-target and the
other-target objects, as doing so might make
the tracking of the toys more difficult and the
distinction between the self-target and other-target
objects less clear. Furthermore, this order provides
a conservative test of the hypothesis that children
can correctly track self-target and other-target
objects because correct performance entails avoid-
ing the foil item, and the foil item occurs relatively
more often in the more salient positions of first or
last.
The toys were then placed on a plastic tray
sequentially from left to right using the same order
as during initial presentation. The order of test
questions (self-question first vs. other-question first)
was kept constant across all items for a given par-
ticipant and counterbalanced between participants,
such that approximately half the participants
received the self-question first and the other partici-
pants received the other-question first.
For the final test trials (two trials apiece for
2-year-olds; three trials apiece for 3-year-olds and
adults), we asked participants to infer which toy
belonged to a third individual who had not been
assigned a toy previously. These questions were
included to test whether participants tend to treat
ownership as mutually exclusive (i.e., a toy
already owned by one person is unlikely to be
owned by another). Thus, Zippy the puppet was
introduced as wanting to join the game and was
placed across the table from the participant. The
trials proceeded as before with the addition of a
final test question per set to assess Zippy’s choices:
‘‘Which one is Zippy’s?’’ These trials test whether
participants assume that ownership is mutually
exclusive (i.e., does Zippy own the unassigned
toy?) and were examined separately from the main
analyses.
At the end of the session, a final trial was pre-
sented to the child participants in order for them to
choose a toy to take home. For this trial, children
were asked to designate who owned each of three
differently colored mini-tubs of play-Doh. This was
followed by the standard test protocol. At the end,
children were given the play-Doh they had selected
as a reward for participating. Responses to this trial
were not analyzed.
Results
Scoring. Participants received a score of 1 each
time they selected the relevant assigned object,
separately for self- and other-question trials. If the
question was ‘‘Which one is yours?’’ selecting the
self-assigned object was scored as 1. If the question
was ‘‘Which one is mine?’’ selecting the other-
assigned object was scored as 1. Very rarely (< 1%
of trials), participants selected more than one toy;
such trials were scored as 0. Similarly, if the partici-
pant refused to choose (e.g., ‘‘I don’t know,’’ occur-
ring on 5%, of trials for 2-year-olds, < 1% for
3-year-olds, and 0% for adults), they received a
score of 0.
The older participants (3-year-olds and adults)
received 24 questions (12 item sets [4 identical,
4 participant-plain, and 4 varied] · 2 questions [self
vs. other]), whereas the 2-year-olds received 18
questions (9 item sets [3 identical, 3 participant-
plain, and 3 varied] · 2 questions [self vs. other]).
Within each cell of the design (i.e., each item type
and question combination; e.g., self-question for
identical trials), scores were summed and could
potentially range from 0 to 4 for 3-year-olds and
adults, and from 0 to 3 for 2-year-olds. Because
2-year-olds received only 9 trials instead of 12, we
adjusted their scores by a constant (4 ⁄ 3) so that they
could be analyzed on the same scale as the older
age groups. On rare occasion, a session ended early
due to child fatigue, thereby resulting in skipped
trials (3% of children’s trials); in such cases, the
scores were adjusted to account for the missing
trial(s). Thus, for all participants, the adjusted
scores for a given trial type and question could
range from 0 to 4.
Preliminary analysis. We conducted a preliminary
analysis including question order as a factor (Age
Group · Question Order · Question Type [self-
question, other-question]), to determine whether
performance varied as a function of the order in
which the questions were posed (i.e., whether the
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participant received the self-questions first or the
other-questions first). There were no significant
effects involving question order, so all further anal-
yses collapse over this factor.
Chance values. To calculate the probability of
selecting the assigned object by chance, we took
into consideration that participants received two
questions in each item set. Although all three toys
were available for selection on both questions, par-
ticipants tended not to select the same choice twice.
Therefore, whereas chance for the first question is
33% (1 ⁄ 3), chance for the second question depends
on which toy was selected on the first question.
Specifically, when the assigned object for the sec-
ond question had not already been selected on the
first question, then the chance for the second ques-
tion was 50% (one of the two remaining toys).
However, when the assigned object for the second
question had already been selected on the first ques-
tion, then the chance for the second question was 0
(as the assigned object no longer remained). Based
on participants’ choices on the first question, we
determined that chance on the second question
ranged from 32% to 50%, varying as a function of
age and question (self vs. other). We then averaged
the chance values for Questions 1 and 2, within
each age group and question. These composite
chance levels ranged from 33% to 42% (times 4
trials = 1.33–1.68). These were the values used in
t-test comparisons to chance, reported next.
Primary analyses. The scores were entered into a
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA),
with age group (3: 2-year-olds, 3-year-olds, adults)
as a between-subjects variable, and item set (3:
identical, participant-plain, varied) and question
type (2: self-question, other-question) as within-
subjects variables. The data are presented in
Figures 3–5.
We obtained a main effect of age group, F(2,
54) = 48.55, p < .001, gp
2 = .64, indicating that per-
formance improved with age (Ms = 2.01, 2.98, and
3.92 at ages 2 years, 3 years, and adults, respec-
tively; all scores differ from one another at p < .001,
Bonferroni’s). There was a main effect of item type,
F(2, 108) = 5.96, p < .01, gp
2 = .10, and an Item
Type · Question interaction, F(2, 108) = 9.57, p <
.001, gp
2 = .15. However, both of these results must
be interpreted in light of the significant three-way
interaction among item type, question, and age
group, F(4, 108) = 3.92, p < .01, gp
2 = .13.
For adults, performance on the ownership ques-
tions did not differ by either item type or question.
Scores in each of these cells ranged from 95% to
100% accurate, showing adults’ excellent capacity
to identify the owner, across all item sets and both
self- and other-questions. All these scores were sig-
nificantly greater than chance, all ps < .001. Three-
year-olds also performed very well across all three
item types and both questions (72%–80% correct),
although performance dropped slightly on the
other-question for the identical sets (62%). This
score was significantly lower than the self-question
for the identical sets, and significantly lower than
the other-question on the varied (control) sets, both
ps < .05, Bonferroni’s. Nonetheless, 3-year-olds
selected the appropriate object significantly above
chance with all item types and both questions,
ts(17) > 3.8, ps £ .001.
In contrast to the older two age groups, 2-year-
olds had more difficulty with the ownership ques-
tions. For the self-question, performance was lower
on both the identical and participant-plain sets than
on the varied (control) sets, ps < .05, Bonferroni’s.
For the other-question, performance was lower on
the identical sets than on the varied sets, p < .001.
For the identical sets, children in this age group,
like the 3-year-olds, performed significantly better
when asked about their own toy than the research-
Figure 3. Identical item sets: mean number of trials (out of 4)
selecting the assigned object as a function of age group,
condition, and question type.
Note. Asterisks indicate values that are significantly above
chance.
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er’s toy, p < .01. In contrast, for the participant-
plain sets, children performed significantly better
when asked about the researcher’s (nonplain) toy
than their own (plain) toy, p = .001. Overall, 2-year-
olds were significantly above chance on the varied
sets for both self- and other-question, ts(20) > 3,
ps < .01, showing that they understood the task.
They were also significantly above chance for the
participant-plain set for the other-question,
t(20) = 3.80, p = .001. However, they did not exceed
chance for the other-question on the identical set,
or for the self-question on the identical or partici-
pant-plain sets.
Object position. During test, the toys were equi-
distant from the participant. However, as noted
earlier, the toy at one end of the tray was closest
to the researcher. We thus conducted additional
analyses to determine whether object location
influenced responses. Specifically, we asked: (a) Do
participants select the target toy more often when it
is closest to the researcher than when it is in either
of the other two positions? (b) When given a choice,
which do participants select more often: the correct
toy or the close toy?
To answer the first question, we separated the
trials into confounded trials (correct answer was
closest to the researcher; 28% of trials) and uncon-
founded trials (correct answer was in either of the
other positions; 72% of trials), and then calculated,
for each participant and trial type, the proportion
of trials on which the target object was selected. We
entered these scores into a 3 (age group) · 2 (ques-
tion type: self, other) · 2 (trial type: confounded,
unconfounded) ANOVA. This analysis revealed no
significant effects of trial type, indicating that object
position had no effect on participants’ choices, for
either self-questions or other-questions.
To answer the second question, we focused
exclusively on trials for which the target toy was in
an unconfounded position, such that the correct
choice was not the close choice. We computed a
difference score, of the proportion of trials on
which a participant selected the correct choice,
minus the proportion of trials on which he or she
selected the close choice (i.e., the toy closest to
the researcher). (Participants could also select the
choice that was neither correct nor close, although
such responses were not relevant to this analysis.)
Figure 5. Varied item sets: mean number of trials (out of 4)
selecting the assigned object as a function of age group,
condition, and question type.
Note. Asterisks indicate values that are significantly above
chance. Plus signs (+) indicate trends (p < .07).
Figure 4. Participant-plain item sets: mean number of trials (out
of 4) selecting the assigned object as a function of age group,
condition, and question type.
Note. Asterisks indicate values that are significantly above
chance.
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The difference scores could range from )1 to +1,
with negative scores indicating selection of the
close choice, and positive scores indicating selection
of the correct choice. We compared these scores
with chance (0). Results indicate that for each age
group and each question type (self vs. other), par-
ticipants selected the correct choice significantly
more often than the close choice, all ps < .05. More-
over, participants in each age group and question
type selected the correct choice above chance, all
ps < .05. These results converge to indicate that
object position does not substantially influence the
performance on ownership questions.
Zippy trials. The Zippy trials assess the extent to
which participants view ownership as mutually
exclusive, namely, that a new individual is likely to
own an object that is not already owned by some-
one else. To test this, we examined how often par-
ticipants chose the unassigned object as belonging
to Zippy. The percentage of Zippy trials on which
the unassigned object was selected was 35%, 57%,
and 50% at ages 2 years, 3 years, and adults,
respectively. This score exceeds chance (33%) for
the 3-year-olds, t(15) = 3.13, p < .01, and showed a
trend for the adults, t(17) = 1.61, p = .062, one-
tailed. However, adults often refused to make a
choice (48% of trials) because a toy was never
assigned to Zippy (explaining, e.g., ‘‘You didn’t
say’’ or ‘‘He doesn’t have one’’). In contrast, 2-year-
olds refused to make a choice on only 5% of trials,
and 3-year-olds never did so. When focusing only
on trials for which a choice was made, adults’
remaining scores average 97% selection of the un-
assigned object (greater than chance, p < .01). These
results suggest that when forced to make a choice,
3-year-olds and adults (but not 2-year-olds) main-
tain a pattern of mutual exclusivity in their owner-
ship judgments.
Another way to assess this same issue is to
examine how often participants selected a toy for
Zippy that they did not already assign to another
participant (independent of the initial assignment
provided by the researcher). For example, a partici-
pant who selected the unassigned toy for the
self-question, the participant-assigned toy for the
other-question, and the researcher-assigned toy for
the Zippy question provided mutually exclusive
choices, even all three responses were incorrect. By
this measure, participants showed mutually exclu-
sive responses for Zippy on a mean of 74%, 98%,
and 100% of trials at ages 2 years, 3 years, and
adults, respectively. We calculated chance as 44%,
because of the 27 possible combinations of responses
(participant-assigned, researcher-assigned, or unas-
signed) to the three questions (yours, mine,
Zippy’s), 12 combinations were ones for which the
Zippy response was mutually exclusive with each of
the other two responses. At every age, the degree of
mutually exclusivity was significantly greater than
chance, ps £ .01.
Discussion
Experiment 1 demonstrates that 3-year-olds, like
adults, construe ownership as a nonobvious prop-
erty that does not reduce to outward perceptual or
functional features. When shown three identical
items and told ownership designations for two of
them (‘‘This is my toy . . . This is your toy’’), they
track spatiotemporal cues to identify which item is
their own. If young children construed ownership
simply in terms of the perceptual or functional
properties of an object (e.g., ‘‘I have a yellow car
that can roll’’), then they would perform at chance
levels on the identical sets. Instead, they consis-
tently selected the toy that had initially been
assigned to them. This result cannot be due to the
owned item receiving special emphasis, because all
three toys were highlighted during the teaching
phase. It is also notable that participants spontane-
ously made use of object history without any spe-
cial instructions or encouragement from the
researcher. Three-year-olds were able to track own-
ership even when the item assigned to them was
undesirable (the participant-plain sets).
In contrast, 2-year-olds had difficulty with both
the identical sets and the undesirable sets, tending
to select at chance on the identical sets and to
select one of the more desirable toys on the unde-
sirable sets. The basis of this difficulty is currently
unclear. Two-year-olds were able to track which
toys they owned when the toys in a set were
equivalent but perceptually distinct, showing that
they attend to ownership information and under-
stood the task. Perhaps they undergo conceptual
change in their understanding of ownership (at
first thinking that it reduces to perceptual features
or desirability). However, they instead may have
difficulty inhibiting the response to select a more
attractive toy, or insufficient motivation not to
choose the more attractive toy. Further research
would be needed to determine whether this is a
conceptual error or a performance error, but at the
least this result shows developmental change in
the power of original possession when it conflicts
with desirability.
Interestingly, children as well as adults were sen-
sitive to the ownership of objects assigned to
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another person (i.e., the researcher). By 2 years of
age, they appropriately identified the researcher as
the owner of the toys she had assigned to herself,
for the participant-plain and varied sets, and by
3 years of age, they did so even when all three
items in a set were identical. Thus, young children
consider object history to determine ownership,
even for nonself owners.
Although performance was excellent overall for
both self- and other-questions, the child partici-
pants were better at tracking ownership for items
assigned to themselves than for items assigned to
the researcher, for the identical sets. These findings
fit with Cunningham et al.’s (2008) work showing a
memory advantage for self-owned items. We spec-
ulate that participants are more motivated to
encode and remember information regarding their
own possessions than those of others. That this
effect appears in 2-year-olds suggests it is a funda-
mental bias.
Finally, participants showed a mutual exclusivity
bias concerning ownership, rarely assigning an
object to Zippy that had already been assigned to
another owner. Mutual exclusivity is a principle
that young children adhere to in their word exten-
sions (Markman, 1989; Markman, Wasow, &
Hansen, 2003), and it is notable that this same prin-
ciple applies outside the realm of labeling.
Altogether, the results of Experiment 1 suggest
that children as young as 3 years of age understand
that ownership is rooted in object history and not
overt perceptual or functional cues. In Experiment
2, we examine another nonobvious feature of own-
ership, namely, that owned objects have special
value.
Experiment 2: Endowment Effect
Experiment 2 tests the endowment effect by
assigning objects to owners (as in Experiment 1)
and then asking participants which item they pre-
fer. In contrast to prior studies of the endowment
effect, we directly manipulated whether same kind
or different kind of objects are considered. Another
major difference from prior work is that we simply
asked for liking judgments (‘‘Which one do you
like best?’’), whereas prior studies of the endow-
ment effect made use of bargaining tasks, in which
a participant was asked whether they wish to
trade an owned object for another object. Although
both methods are valid and useful, the liking task
more directly assesses the evaluation of owned
objects.
Method
Participants. Participants included twenty 2-year-
olds (11 girls; 2.2–2.9, M = 2.6), seventeen 3-year-
olds (9 girls; 3.1–4.4, M = 3.8), and 18 adults
(12 women; 17–21, M = 18.3). Children were recruited
from communities in and around a Midwestern
university town; most were White. Adults were
undergraduates at a large university in the same
town who participated for course credit; 67% were
White. One additional 2-year-old was dropped for
answering fewer than one third of the test ques-
tions. Seven additional children were dropped due
to experimenter error.
Materials. The materials were identical to those
of Experiment 1.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of
Experiment 1 except that the questions asked for
liking judgments rather than ownership judgments.
Thus, participants were asked: (a) ‘‘Which one do
you like best?’’ (self-question) and (b) ‘‘Which one
do I like best?’’ (other-question).
Results
Scoring. Participants received a score of 1 each
time they selected the relevant assigned object, sepa-
rately for self- and other-question trials. If the ques-
tion was ‘‘Which one do you like best?’’ selecting
the self-assigned object was scored as 1. If the ques-
tion was ‘‘Which one do I like best?’’ selecting the
other-assigned object was scored as 1. Very rarely
(< 1% of trials), participants selected more than one
toy. Such trials were scored as 0. Similarly, when
the participant refused to choose (e.g., ‘‘I don’t
know,’’ occurring on 5% of trials for 2-year-olds, 0%
for 3-year-olds, and 6% for adults), they received a
score of 0. Scores were summed and adjusted as in
Experiment 1. There were no skipped trials.
Chance values were calculated as in Study 1.
Preliminary analysis. We conducted a preliminary
analysis including question order as a factor (Age
Group · Question Order · Question Type [self vs.
other]) to determine whether performance varied as
a function of the order in which the questions were
posed (i.e., self-questions first vs. other-questions
first). There were no significant effects involving
question order, so all further analyses collapse over
this factor.
Primary analyses. The primary question was
whether participants would prefer the toy that was
owned. This is tested most directly by comparing
responses to the self-question with chance (1.33).
Both 2- and 3-year-olds selected the self-assigned
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objects above chance on the identical sets—2-year-
olds: t(19) = 2.4, ps < .05; 3-year-olds: t(16) = 2.7,
p < .05—and the varied sets—2-year-olds: t(19) = 3.0,
p < .01; 3-year-olds: t(16) = 2.0, p = .06—but not the
participant-plain sets (ps > .50). Adults also selected
the self-assigned objects above chance on the
identical sets, t(17) = 3.3, p < .01, but not on the
varied or participant-plain sets. Thus, all age groups
showed an endowment effect for identical sets, and
children showed an endowment effect for varied
sets.
Responses to the other-question could reflect
either of two beliefs: (a) that the researcher is sub-
ject to an endowment effect or (b) that initial
assignment of the toys reflected the researcher’s
preferences (i.e., she assigned her favorite toys to
herself). For the other-question, 2- and 3-year-olds
were above chance for participant-plain sets
only—2-year-olds: t(19) = 2.8, p < .05; 3-year-olds:
t(16) = 2.5, p < .05—and adults were above chance
on all three types of sets—ts(17) > 2.9, ps < .01.
Thus, adults consistently assume that the researcher
will prefer the toy that she assigned to herself,
whereas children primarily assume that the
researcher would prefer her own toy on the partici-
pant-plain sets only (perhaps due to avoidance of
the plain object).
In order to examine how performance changed as
a function of age, item set, and question type, the
scores were entered into a repeated measures
ANOVA, with age group (3: 2-year-olds, 3-year-
olds, adults) as a between-subjects variable, and
item set (3: identical, participant-plain, varied) and
question type (2: self-question, other-question) as
within-subjects variables. The data are presented in
Figures 3–5.
There was a main effect of question, F(1, 52) =
5.29, p < .05, gp
2 = .09, although this must be inter-
preted within two higher-order interactions. A
Question · Age Group interaction, F(2, 52) = 8.28,
p = .001, gp
2 = .24, indicated that adults had higher
scores for other- than self-questions, p < .001, but
the other ages did not. As noted earlier, adults may
have made the rational inference that the researcher
chose to assign herself the objects that she liked
the best. There was also a Question · Item Type
interaction, F(2, 104) = 38.67, p < .001, gp
2 = .43. For
identical items, self-questions were higher than
other-questions, p < .01, indicating an endowment
effect for items assigned to the self. For participant-
plain items, other-questions were higher than self-
questions, p < .001, indicating avoidance of the
plain items. For varied items, there were no self-
other differences.
Position analyses. As in Experiment 1, we first
separated the trials into confounded (28%) and un-
confounded (72%), and then calculated, for each
participant and trial type, the proportion of trials
on which the assigned toy was selected. We con-
ducted a 3 (age group) · 2 (question type: self,
other) · 2 (trial type: confounded, unconfounded)
ANOVA. The only significant effect involving trial
type was a Trial Type · Question Type interaction,
F(1, 50) = 23.17, p < .001, gp
2 = .32. For other-ques-
tions, participants were more likely to pick the
assigned toy when it was confounded than uncon-
founded (73% vs. 53%, p < .001), indicating that
participants used proximity to the researcher as one
cue regarding the researcher’s preferences. In con-
trast, for self-questions, participants were more
likely to pick the assigned toy when it was uncon-
founded than confounded (51% vs. 40%, p < .01).
As in Experiment 1, we then focused exclusively
on trials for which the target toy was in an uncon-
founded position. For self-questions, participants in
all age groups preferred the assigned toy over the
toy that was close to the researcher (difference
score Ms = .35, .26, and .27 at 2 years, 3 years, and
adults, respectively; all ps <.05), and selected the
assigned toy significantly above chance (ps £ .001).
For the other-question, adults selected the assigned
toy over the close toy (p < .001), and greater than
chance (p < .001), whereas children showed prefer-
ence for neither the assigned nor the close toy.
(Difference scores for the other-toy selections were
.10, ).01, and .52 at ages 2 years, 3 years, and
adults, respectively.) Thus, object position had
relatively little effect on performance.
Zippy trials. The Zippy trials assess the extent to
which participants assume that preferences are
mutually exclusive, namely, that a new individual
is likely to prefer an object that is not already
owned by someone else. To assess this, we exam-
ined how often participants chose the unassigned
object as one that Zippy likes best. The percentage
of Zippy trials on which the unassigned object was
selected was 52%, 44%, and 50% at ages 2 years,
3 years, and adults, respectively. These scores do
not exceed chance (33%) at any age, although they
are borderline significant at age 2 years (p = .059)
and adults (p = .054).
A different way to assess mutual exclusivity of
preferences is to examine how often participants
selected a toy for Zippy that they did not already
select for another participant (regardless of the
researcher’s initial assignment). Thus, we tallied,
for each item set, how often participants selected a
different toy for Zippy than for either of the other
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two questions (self and other). The mean rates of
mutually exclusive responses were 83%, 100%, and
71% at ages 2 years, 3 years, and adults, respec-
tively. These scores were all significantly greater
than chance (44%), ps < .05.
Comparisons with Experiment 1. Although the pri-
mary purpose of Experiment 2 was to assess
whether owned objects have special value (endow-
ment effect), the data also permit us to ask whether
and when the ownership judgments in Experiment
1 differ from mere liking. In order to assess this
question, we conducted a set of analyses comparing
responses across the two experiments: ownership
(Experiment 1) and liking (Experiment 2). Specifi-
cally, we conducted a 3 (age group: 2 years,
3 years, adults) · 2 (task: ownership, liking) · 3
(item type: identical, participant-plain, varied) · 2
(question: self, other) repeated measures ANOVA.
We report only those effects involving task.
Results indicate numerous significant effects
involving task (a main effect of task; Item Type ·
Task; Question · Task; Age · Task; Question ·
Age · Task; Item · Question · Task), all subsumed
under a significant four-way interaction (Ques-
tion · Age · Item · Task), F(4, 212) = 4.96, p = .001,
gp
2 = .09. Two-year-olds showed no significant task
differences (ps ranging from .24 to .86). In contrast,
3-year-olds and adults consistently selected the
assigned toys more often in Experiment 1 (owner-
ship task) than in Experiment 2 (liking task). For
3-year-olds, p values ranged from .026 to < .001; for
adults, p values were all £ .001, with the exception
of the other-question for participant-plain sets,
where p = .098. Overall, then, for 3-year-olds and
adults, ownership judgments are distinct from pref-
erences.
Discussion
Experiment 2 was designed to examine whether
children and adults prefer objects that they own
(endowment effect). We found that children as
young as 2 years of age show greater liking of
objects to which they are assigned as owners. For
example, the objects in the identical sets were phys-
ically indistinguishable, yet participants in all age
groups indicated that they most liked the object
that had been assigned to them. Similarly, for the
varied sets, 2-year-olds indicated that they most
liked the object that had been assigned to them.
This is a striking result, and it is important to note
that other patterns were certainly possible. For
example, children could have shown preference for
the researcher’s toy, out of envy or social referenc-
ing. Or, children may have made their liking judg-
ments exclusively on the basis of the material
properties of the objects. Instead, however, the non-
visible property of ownership guided their prefer-
ence judgments.
The only items for which performance did not
exceed chance were the participant-plain sets.
However, it is perhaps not surprising that partici-
pants did not select these items above chance, given
the baseline undesirability of these toys. Therefore,
in order to provide another assessment of the
extent to which even the plain items might have
been enhanced in desirability, we asked a separate
group of 19 undergraduates and 14 children (2.3–
4.3; mean age =3.5) to choose which toy they liked
best, given the participant-plain sets. The toys and
test questions were identical to those of Experiment
2; the only difference was that no ownership infor-
mation was provided beforehand. As expected, in
the absence of ownership information, preference
for the plain choice was quite low at both ages
(Ms = 23% and 4% for children and adults, respec-
tively; both scores are significantly below chance,
ps £ .05). For adults, this rate was significantly
lower than the rate at which adults selected the
plain item when ownership information was pro-
vided (22% in the self-question of Experiment 2),
t(35) = 2.07, p < .05, indicating that liking of even
the plain item was enhanced by first assigning it to
the participant. For children, however, the score in
the absence of ownership information did not sig-
nificantly differ from the score in the presence of
ownership information (34%), suggesting that for
young children, the endowment effect may not be
powerful enough to override clear a priori prefer-
ences.
Nonetheless, the above-chance performance on
the identical item sets (at all ages) and the varied-
item sets (for 2- and 3-year-olds), as well as the
above-baseline performance on the plain sets (for
adults) all argue that ownership confers special
value on objects, across the life span. This finding
extends beyond prior work in demonstrating that
preference is for the particular object assigned (not
just for that type of object). These data are consis-
tent with both an endowment effect and a mere
ownership effect.
When asked about the researcher’s preferences,
only adults consistently assume that the researcher
will prefer the toy that she assigned to herself. Chil-
dren, in contrast, primarily assume that the
researcher would prefer her own toy only on the
participant-plain sets only (perhaps because they
assume that the researcher will not like the plain
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object). These data suggest that the endowment
effect in children is specific to self-judgments.
Adults may expect that others will display an
endowment effect, or they may simply assume that
the researcher assigned the most preferred item to
herself to begin with. More research would be
needed to tease apart these two explanations.
The most striking developmental change con-
cerned the comparison between the two experiments.
Three-year-olds and adults distinguish ownership
from likability, reporting that they owned objects
even when they did not like them (e.g., the partici-
pant-plain items). In contrast, 2-year-olds show no
difference between the ownership task (Experiment
1) and the endowment task (Experiment 2). In other
words, 2-year-olds conflate ownership with desirabil-
ity, thus failing to grasp that a toy they do not like
actually belongs to them. This result means either
that liking is guiding toddlers’ ownership judgments
(i.e., the two concepts are inseparable) or that owner-
ship is guiding their liking judgments (i.e., a strong
endowment effect). Either way, the result indicates
an endowment effect in 2-year-olds, as they
select their own object above chance on the liking
judgment.
General Discussion
These data speak to two primary issues in the liter-
ature: What cues do young children use to deter-
mine ownership? And, to what extent does
ownership confer an endowment effect? We discuss
each of these issues in turn.
Cues to Determining Ownership
A mature concept of ownership includes an
understanding that proximity, perceptual or func-
tional features, and desirability, although potent
factors, cannot by themselves determine who owns
what. In other words, ownership is an invisible
quality that can be traced by consideration of object
history rather than by inspection of the properties
of the object. Given the centrality of object history,
it becomes particularly important to track where an
object moves over time.
The present studies demonstrate that children as
young as 3 years of age spontaneously attend to
object history to determine ownership. They do not
conform to the belief that any object that is equiva-
lent in appearance and function to theirs can be
considered their own; rather, they track an object’s
path through time and space, taking care to notice
and remember which of three identical items is
their own.
In addition to this main finding, there were two
additional results that further shed light on chil-
dren’s early ownership judgments. First, partici-
pants in all age groups treated ownership as
mutually exclusive: When asked which object
Zippy owned, in the absence of any prior informa-
tion, they guessed that Zippy would own the object
that was not owned by anyone else. Even 2-year-
olds showed clear evidence for this assumption.
This result suggests that children may understand
that ownership entails considering not just the his-
tory of a person (e.g., Zippy) with an object (e.g.,
the foil), but also what other individuals in the
context own (in this case, that the researcher and
participant already owned the other objects).
The second additional finding concerned self–
other differences. On the ownership task, both
2- and 3-year-olds performed significantly better on
the self-questions than the other-questions. This
parallels prior findings with adults (Cunningham
et al., 2008; van den Bos et al., 2010). Further stud-
ies would be required to determine the source of
this effect; for example, it could be due to differ-
ences in initial attention, encoding, or memory.
Ownership and the Endowment Effect
Ownership is nonobvious in a second respect as
well; namely, ownership in and of itself adds value
to an object (the endowment or mere ownership
effect). The present data are new in several ways.
These data are the first to demonstrate an endow-
ment effect in children 2 and 3 years of age. Prior
to this set of experiments, little was known about
endowment effects in children below age 5. These
younger children provide additional insight into
the developmental roots of this behavior. The pres-
ent findings suggest that positive evaluation of and
preference for one’s own possessions is a basic cog-
nitive disposition, even before children have experi-
ence with conventional economic transactions.
These studies also demonstrate that special value
adheres to the particular individual object that is
owned. We directly manipulated whether same-
kind or different-kind objects were presented, in
contrast to prior work, which typically tested partic-
ipants’ valuation of either the very object they pos-
sess or an object of a different kind. The results we
obtained (that participants prefer the very object
they had been given) suggest that history holds spe-
cial significance for an object (Rozin & Nemeroff,
1990).
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These studies also are the first we know of
to examine participants’ beliefs concerning the
value of owned objects to others (i.e., non-self-
judgments). However, the mechanism by which
another’s preferences reflect ownership likely differ
from the mechanism by which self-preferences
reflect ownership, at least as measured here. In the
current studies, because the researcher was the one
who determined which person owned which toy, it
could be assumed that the researcher assigned
herself the toys she liked best. In other words, the
researcher’s ‘‘liking’’ judgment may have deter-
mined the ownership assignment in the first place.
In contrast, the participant’s ‘‘liking’’ judgment was
a consequence of the ownership assignment. In
future research, it would be interesting to vary how
objects are assigned to owners (e.g., does the partic-
ipant assign the objects, does the researcher assign
the objects, or is object assignment determined ran-
domly?), in order to disentangle initial preferences
from preferences that are a consequence of owner-
ship.
Different theoretical accounts have been offered
for the endowment effect (e.g., loss aversion vs.
added value to an owned object; Beggan, 1992;
Morewedge et al., 2009). The present data support
the interpretation that ownership confers added
value to an object. Because we did not use a barter
task, there was no possibility for loss aversion.
Thus, it may be that loss aversion typically also has
an effect, but from the current research we know
that it is not required in order to obtain an endow-
ment effect.
Conclusions
The present studies suggest that by early pre-
school, children construe ownership as nonobvi-
ous, in two major respects: (a) By age 3 years,
ownership is a relation that cannot be discerned
by outward perceptual or functional features, or
an assessment of who is currently in possession
of the owned object. Instead, it relies on the
history of an object. (b) By age 2 years, ownership
confers special (again, invisible) value to an object
for the owner. By honoring these principles,
young children possess a basic and early-emerg-
ing tendency to treat objects as carrying special
traces of their past. Moreover, this tendency is
apparent without any explicit instructions or
encouragement from the researcher, suggesting
that children spontaneously attend to and track
the nonobvious basis of ownership.
In future research, it would also be valuable to
examine other respects in which ownership may
link to nonobvious bases or consequences. For
example, object value reflects a wealth of nonobvi-
ous properties, including rareness or inaccessibility
(e.g., moon dust), symbolic value (e.g., a scouting
uniform indicates group affiliation; a Ferrari indexes
social standing), or links to famous or beloved indi-
viduals (e.g., handwritten Beatles lyrics; Dittmar,
1992; Frazier, Gelman, Wilson, & Hood, 2009; Porter,
2011). Ownership may also have consequences for
mental state attributions (e.g., what owners vs. non-
owners know about the objects in question).
Ownership is one potent means of demonstrat-
ing this sensitivity to object history, but it is not the
only one. This capacity apparently underlies other
early emerging childhood abilities as well, including
the ability to confer proper names to individuals
(Sorrentino, 2001), and psychological essentialism
more broadly (Bloom, 2010; Gelman, 2003).
Although the capacity to reason about object his-
tory seems straightforward, it can sometimes go
awry. For example, in Capgras syndrome, people
believe that an object or individual has been
replaced by an identical imposter (Edelstyn & Oye-
bode, 1999). This disorder suggests that a concept
of historical continuity can be dissociated from all
relevant properties associated with an individual
(appearances, behaviors). In future research, it will
be important to examine the developmental condi-
tions that foster this understanding.
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